Just War and Human Rights by Schachter, Oscar
Pace International Law Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 1
September 1989
Just War and Human Rights
Oscar Schachter
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Oscar Schachter, Just War and Human Rights , 1 Pace Y.B. Int'l L. 1 (1989)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/1
PACE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Volume 1 1989 Number 1
LECTURE
JUST WAR AND HUMAN RIGHTSt
Oscar Schachtertt
As my title indicates, this lecture concerns two abstract
ideas. Both conceptions have a prominent place in international
law; they have been discussed at length in the treatises and dis-
courses of that discipline. They are not, of course, the exclusive
property or concern of international lawyers. Philosophers, theo-
logians, political scientists, constitutional lawyers oand histori-
ans have pondered their meaning and consequences. But, that
should not mislead us into thinking of these concepts as purely
academic, even in the best sense. They are, above all, ideas that
have powerfully influenced human conduct and continue to do
so. Countless persons have died in wars proclaimed as just.
Many others have given their lives in the cause of human rights
t The second annual Blaine Sloan lecture was delivered on March 15, 1989.
Presented in honor of Blaine Sloan, Professor Emeritus of International Law and
Organization at Pace University, the lecture series is delivered each year to the
University and Law School community in order to promote scholarly debate in
international law.
tt B.S.S., J.D.; Hamilton Fish Professor Emeritus of International Law and Diplo-
macy, Columbia University.
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which they considered more important than life itself. No, these
are not academic topics, abstract as they seem and however
learned the discussions about them. They are ideas that almost
certainly will have an impact on your own lives (even more, I
venture to suggest, than product liability or corporate buy-outs).
The United States has been in four major wars during my life; in
each one, ideas of justice and human rights were used to justify
the wars and their human sacrifices. I am far from sure that they
will be the last wars in which one or both of these ideas will have
an impact.
The Doctrine of Just War
I do not intend to say very much about the history or philo-
sophical underpinnings of the doctrine of just war and of the
various conceptions of justice. My concern is with their contem-
porary manifestations in legitimizing the use of armed force
across national borders. But some historical background is called
for.
The idea or doctrine of just war has ancient roots. It ap-
pears in classical writings and then, more explicitly, in Christian
theology. The important question of whether killing others in
wars was a sin was answered by St. Augustine: not, he said, if
one fought in a just cause. For centuries thereafter, theologians,
philosophers and international lawyers filled the books with
ideas for deciding on the just or unjust character of war.1 They
were, I find, generous in giving reasons to support their rulers'
recourse to war. It was just to use force generally against
wrongs, such as failure to pay debts or to interfere with teaching
the gospel or to seek to achieve inordinate power. Powerful rul-
ers seemed to have had no problem in finding a just cause to
wage war against those thought to be weaker. Although this un-
derstandably produced some cynicism, the idea of just war re-
mained the focus of serious thought on the most troubling moral
problem of the times. It is a problem we still face; when are we
justified, in sacrificing lives, in mass killing, for the sake of a
higher end? In medieval times, just war theorists could consider
On the just war doctrine, see W.V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED
WAR (1981); J.T. JOHNSON, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST? (1984).
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this question on the assumption of a common moral code, ap-
plied and sanctioned by ecclesiastical authority.
When ecclesiastical authority weakened with the rise of na-
tional States, the doctrine of the just war was largely replaced in
the secular world by a quite different conception: the sovereign
right of States to wage war for any reason, at any time. Not that
the rulers ceased to proclaim the justness of their cause; nobody
goes to war without blaming the enemy for its wrongs and prov-
ocations. But in the eyes of the law, the law of nations, the line
between the just and the unjust war faded. It may seem surpris-
ing today that international lawyers, by and large, saw this as a
positive development.2 They had good reasons. For one thing, it
was realistic. It recognized that there was no central institution,
no court, to determine which side had the just cause. The
Church no longer had the authority to do so. States as sovereign
equals could not sit in judgment of each other. Every ruler could
proclaim that his cause was just.
There was also a second reason that international lawyers
welcomed the end of just war doctrine. If just cause did not
matter and every State had the right to wage war, both sides
could be considered as equal under the law. Limits could then
be placed upon their conduct in war on the basis of reciprocity.
It was difficult to achieve such limits when each side saw its
cause as just and the enemy as an outlaw, entitled to no rights.
Since both had equal rights, they could be subjected to equal
duties, based on mutual interest. When you think of it, it is an
extraordinary goal of international law to legitimize mass killing
and the emotional violence of war and, at the same time, to im-
pose limits for humanitarian reasons. Without reciprocity, a reg-
ulatory system could not succeed. As someone remarked, impos-
ing restraints on the scope and conduct of war meant treating
the conflict more like a prize fight than cops and robbers.3 Since
wars were considered inevitable anyway, it was better to try to
legalize and regulate conflicts than vainly to seek to prohibit
them by holding that some wars were unjust.
The ius ad bellum had to be sacrificed, so to speak, for the
ius in bello. Moreover, it was easier to maintain a law of neutral-
See, e.g., J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 1913)
' Claude, Just Wars; Doctrines and Institutions, 95 POL. Sci. Q. 83 (1980).
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ity and to bring conflicts to an end by negotiation if neither side
was treated as an outlaw.
It is interesting to observe how these considerations still
present themselves under the regime of the U.N. Charter. Under
the Charter, we are supposed to distinguish between the law-
breaker and those defending themselves or seeking to enforce
the law. One could say, as the American Catholic Bishops did in
their letter on nuclear weapons,4 that the only just wars today
are those fought as self-defense or collective security. Yet in
practice there is still reluctance in the U.N. to brand one of the
parties to a conflict as the law-breaker, or aggressor. The reason
is simple: the main objective is to bring an end to the fighting by
peaceful means. The U.N. or any other intermediary does not
get far by branding one of the parties an aggressor. The party
thus branded does not accept the finding of guilt or welcome
mediation by the one who has already determined its guilt.
Moreover, branding a State as an aggressor raises the unpleasant
prospect of doing something to stop the aggression, and that
could involve more destruction and lives lost. I do not mean to
say that it is always unwise to condemn a State for aggression;
condemnation can impose costs on the guilty State and also af-
firm the importance of the Charter rule. But it is well to bear in
mind why the other path is often taken (as it was in the recent
Iran-Iraq War). We can more easily understand why interna-
tional law moved away from the medieval idea of just war and
why there is continuing ambivalence on the part of governments
on the wisdom of adjudging quilt in cases of armed conflict.
There is, of course, an important difference between the
traditional notion of just war and the Charter's conception of
legitimate force. Under the Charter, force is not legitimized just
because it is in the interest of justice. Force is allowed only in
the interest of maintaining peace and for defense against aggres-
sion. The Charter, in this respect, clearly chooses peace over jus-
tice. It does not allow States to use arms to enforce treaties or
rules of law. Some respected jurists have found this to be a grave
defect. On rare occasions, governments have claimed a right to
I National Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace:
"The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," ORIGINS, National Catholic
Documentary Service 13:1 (1983).
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use force to protect their legal rights. The British and French
argued that way in support of their invasion of Egypt in 1956
when the Suez Canal was nationalized. They lost the support of
the U.S. and most other countries on that occasion and since
then their argument has had little support."
The Use of Force for Human Rights
The real challenge to the Charter's emphasis on peace has
come from another direction; human rights. This may at first
seem strange since human rights is so often viewed as the most
idealistic of aspirations, the creation of philosophers and the un-
worldly. But when we reflect on its history, starting, for exam-
ple, with the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the
French Revolution, it is evident that much blood has been
spilled for its sake. Men and women have fought, often against
great odds, for what we would consider today as their human
rights. This is not the occasion to go into that history, but if we
think about it, we should not be surprised that the strongest
challenges to the principle of non-use of force are made in the
name of human rights, more precisely, in the name of particular
human rights. These challenges fall into three categories: one
justifies armed force in the cause of national liberation and the
struggle against alien domination and racist regimes; a second
justifies force in the interest of democracy and against regimes
not based on the consent of the governed (this finds expression
in the Reagan doctrine); and, the third justifies force to end
atrocities such as mass killings and large-scale deprivations of
the necessities of life.
These three categories obviously fit into the broader con-
cept of human rights. However, they select different rights and
they have different supporters often strongly antagonistic to
each other. Yet they tend to share a common legal argument di-
rected against the interpretation of the Charter that I had sug-
gested earlier.
One leg of their argument is essentially textual, addressed
to the peculiar construction of the Charter's prohibition against
Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHi. L.
REv. 113, 125-28 (1986).
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the use and threat of force. That provision, they emphasize, does
not prohibit the unilateral recourse to force in general. It only
prohibits force against the political independence and territorial
integrity of a State or in any manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations. It is then argued that when force is
used to protect human rights, it is not directed against the polit-
ical independence or territorial integrity of a State nor is it in-
consistent with the purposes set forth in the Charter itself. The
nub of this argument is that when force is used in another coun-
try for a purpose recognized in the Charter itself, (one might
say, a noble purpose) the force is not aimed "against political
independence or territorial integrity."
Although this reasoning may seem, at first, a possible inter-
pretation, it does not withstand analysis. Two specific reasons
can be given. One is that any invasion or bombing of a State
violates its territorial rights and its political independence. It re-
quires an Orwellian interpretation of these terms to accept the
idea that an invader would protect the true will of the people
and, hence, would not deprive the invaded State of its indepen-
dence or territory. The second ground for rejecting the permis-
sive interpretation is that the maintenance of international
peace is itself one of the purposes of the Charter - indeed, the
very first. Hence, the use of force by a State in another country
without that country's consent must be considered as inconsis-
tent with a major Charter purpose. It is strange, if not absurd, to
argue that the added reason for the illegality of force (namely,
inconsistency with a Charter purpose) results in an exception to
the general prohibition of force against political independence
and territorial integrity. Moreover, it ignores the obvious point
that force consistent with one purpose, e.g., self-determination,
would be contrary to the major purpose of maintaining peace.
Of course, an issue of this magnitude cannot be definitely
answered by analysis of text alone, nor should it be. But since
textual arguments have been made to justify far-reaching excep-
tions to the prohibition of Article 2(4), it is not of importance
that they be answered. It is even more important to consider the
ends and values that are at stake in this controversy. For no text
adopted by governments can or should foreclose choices imposed
by changing conditions and by new perceptions of ends and
means. The U.N. Charter is, as often stated, a living instrument.
[Vol. 1:1
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It is, like every constitutional instrument, continuously inter-
preted, molded and adapted to meet the interests of the parties.
This process is ensured by the generality of language, the
broad range of the Charter purposes and principles and the in-
evitable ambiguities. It is also insured by the raw facts of inter-
national life: the great differences in power and wealth, the tech-
nologies of destruction and the misery and frustrations of the
masses of people. These factors, and others, have an impact on
how we construe and give effect to the Charter. The Charter sets
forth ideals which nearly all can accept but it operates in a non-
ideal world of clashing interests. No issues cut as deeply into
these conflicts as those concerned with armed force. With or
without the Charter, force must be both legitimated and limited
in a society of independent States. The absence of a supreme
authority only underlines this necessity. States, no more than
individuals, can consider themselves entirely free to take up
arms against another. No one, I believe, disputes that
conclusion.
I come back to the question of justifying force for human
rights, and to the three categories of justification I mentioned
earlier.
1. Force for Self-Determination and National Liberation
I will begin with the controversial proposition that the use
of force is and should be legitimate in the struggle of peoples for
self-determination and national liberation. This proposition,
prominent in the period of decolonization, has not disappeared
with the end of the colonial empires. It is said to apply in other
struggles against alien domination and racist regimes. Commen-
tators have referred to it as the contemporary doctrine of just
war." United Nation's bodies have wrestled with it for some de-
cades. Their resolutions are models of tortuous and equivocal
drafting. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be drawn about the
legal position accepted by most States. The key resolution in
this regard is the well-known Declaration of Principles of Inter-
national Law, adopted without dissent in 1970 after some ten
' Claude, supra note 3.
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years of study and debate by the U.N. General Assembly.' Most
States, including the United States, refer frequently to this reso-
lution as an authoritative expression of the law of the Charter
and related customary law.
The resolution recognizes, clearly enough, that people may
use force to resist governments which deprive them of self-deter-
mination. This can be read as recognizing the right to revolt; a
right that does not involve the use of force in "international re-
lations" and, therefore, is not within the terms of Article 2(4).
The resolution does go on to say that peoples struggling for self-
determination "are entitled to seek and receive support" from
external powers but such support must be "in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter."8 This last
clause was emphasized by a number of governments (especially
the Western group) as including Article 2(4). In short, they did
not intend to make an exception to Article 2(4) in this case.
If the legality of foreign military support on behalf of na-
tional liberation movements were put to the International Court,
I believe the judges would have to conclude that no such excep-
tion to the general prohibition has been accepted by the commu-
nity of States. This conclusion was in fact expressed by Judge
Schwebel, the U.S. member of the International Court, in his
dissenting opinion in the Nicaraguan case.9 Although the issue
was not before the Court and the judgment did not deal with it,
Judge Schwebel did address it briefly. He concluded that:
... it is lawful for a foreign state or movement to give to a peo-
ple struggling for self-determination moral, political and humani-
tarian assistance; but it is not lawful for a foreign state or move-
ment to intervene in that struggle with force or to provide arms,
supplies or other logistical support in the prosecution of armed
rebellion.'0
' Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter Friendly Relations resolutions]. It is often referred to, in the trade, as the Friendly
Relations resolutions.
8 Id.
' Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits).
"0 Id. at 351, para. 180.
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Before leaving the subject of self-determination, I should
mention that its place in the hierarchy of international purposes
is by no means entirely clear. The Declaration of Principles
which strongly affirms that right also includes the following par-
agraph: "Every state shall refrain from any action aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial
integrity of any other state or country.""
This paragraph reflects the position of most governments
which may oppose some types of alien rule in other countries
but are strongly opposed to foreign powers supporting national,
ethnic or religious communities that seek separation or auton-
omy. We should, therefore, not be mislead by the strong rhetoric
in favor of self-determination in some places. The more realistic
conclusion is that nation-States of all kinds share a common in-
terest in opposition to self-determination claims that threaten
their national unity.
2. Force Against Repressive and Non-Democratic Regimes
Even more contentious than the issue raised by the national
liberation movements, has been the controversy regarding mili-
tary aid given to insurgent forces seeking to topple allegedly re-
pressive regimes. In these cases, Soviet-American antagonism
has been in the forefront. Communist movements have often re-
ceived military aid from the Soviet Union and its allies, and, on
the other side, resistance forces opposed to leftist governments
have obtained arms, training and advice from the United States
and occasionally from other governments supportive of U.S. po-
sitions. The U.S. position, which has come to be known as the
Reagan doctrine, justifies military support to freedom fighters in
their armed resistance to pro-Soviet regimes.
From both a political and legal perspective, the Reagan doc-
trine in its broad formulation, goes beyond prior U.S. positions
that had involved military aid to anti-communist forces. Under
the Truman policy, announced in 1947 (and later elevated to
doctrine), the U.S. undertook to give military and economic sup-
port to governments of "free peoples" resisting "subjugation by
" Friendly Relations resolutions, G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 7.
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armed minorities or by outside pressure."12 In political terms, it
supported existing regimes friendly to the United States against
Soviet-supported revolutionary movements. From the stand-
point of international law, it was, in one view, no more than aid
to a government at its request for the purpose of maintaining
law and order within the country; consequently, it did not in-
volve force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of the State. The U.S. military aid to Greece and Turkey,
in accordance with the Truman doctrine, was not widely chal-
lenged on legal grounds. However, critics of the Truman doc-
trine among governments and legal commentators, contended
that the U.S. aid involved an intervention in a civil war, thus
violating political independence of the country. From the U.S.
side, an additional argument was that the support of insurgents
by a foreign power (the U.S.S.R.) justified U.S. aid to the gov-
ernment under the principle of collective self-defense.
These legal and policy issues became more controversial
when in the 1960's the U.S. expanded its military aid to the
South Vietnam government into a massive military action
against both the internal insurgents (Viet Cong) and the govern-
ment of North Vietnam which heavily supported the insurgency.
Critics condemned the U.S. on several grounds: for aiding an un-
popular government, for seeking to determine the political
destiny of South Vietnam and for internationalizing a civil war
by carrying it to North Vietnamese territory and that of neigh-
boring countries. The principal U.S. legal argument asserted the
right of collective self-defense on behalf of the independent
State of South Vietnam. The U.S. bombings of North Vietnam
and Cambodia were claimed to be a necessary and proportionate
defense on behalf of the Republic of South Vietnam which had
been subjected to armed attack by North Vietnam and the Viet
Cong, supported by the north. The judgments on these factual
and category differences have been left to the historians, but the
American people quite clearly expressed widespread opposition
to the war.
The Reagan policy of the 1980's went beyond the principle
of aiding established regimes against Communist subversion. It
1" For text, see THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: HARRY S. TRUMAN 1947 178-
79 (U.S. Gov't Print. Off. 1963).
[Vol. 1:1
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/1
JUST WAR
was a response to the increase in the number of Third World
governments that had been supported by the U.S.S.R. and were
regarded as under its influence. A potential threat to U.S. secur-
ity, along with a concern over denial of basic democratic rights,
were given as reasons for U.S. action against the governments in
question. Action to overthrow unfriendly governments had been
taken by U.S. officials on previous occasions (Iran in 1953, Gua-
temala in 1954 and Chile in 1970) but they were meant to be
covert acts supporting internal coups d'etat. No serious attempt
was made by the U.S. to justify them as legal. Indeed, the U.S.
continued to maintain a strong position that subversion and in-
direct aggression were contrary to international law. The Reagan
doctrine, in contrast, openly proclaimed the legitimacy of foreign
military intervention to overthrow leftist totalitarian
governments.
A variety of arguments were advanced by its proponents to
support the Reagan policy. One such line of argument, especially
favored by non-lawyers, considered the international law rules
against unilateral use of force as relatively unimportant. They
emphasized the higher values of national security and freedom. 3
They also minimized the prohibitions of international law as
dead-letter rules ignored by many States. In it was argued that
violations by the U.S.S.R., and others and the failure of the U.N.
to protect States by collective action have destroyed the under-
lying premises of the Charter principle renouncing the use of
force. But it is important to note that, unlike such commenta-
tors, the U.S. Government itself has never argued that Article
2(4) is legally defunct; it has, on the contrary, condemned others
for their violations and defended its own record of compliance.
Other arguments for the lawfulness of the principle of the
Reagan doctrine attempt to find support in the Charter itself.
One such argument seeks to rely on the Charter purposes and
principles that support self-rule and political freedom by main-
taining that a contextual interpretation supersedes a restrictive
or textual reading of Article 2(4). One writer goes so far as to
claim Article 2(4) to be a "means" only, and, therefore, sub-
". KRAUTHAMMER, MORALITY AND THE REAGAN DOCTRINE THE NEW REPUBLIC 17, 18
(1986).
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ordinate to the Charter ends.1 4 These arguments based on
higher purposes are the same as those made to support the right
to use force for national liberation or humanitarian ends. As
noted earlier, they ignore the primary purpose of the Charter -
to prevent breaches of the peace. They would deprive both Arti-
cle 2(3) and Article 2(4) of nearly all their effect.
A further argument for the Reagan doctrine maintains that
governments which deny political freedoms and democratic
rights cannot be considered to be based on "the consent of the
governed" and, consequently, they lack legitimacy in a political
and legal sense.15 They are said to be no more than de facto
regimes which should not represent the State or its people under
international law. Accordingly, the use of force against such re-
gimes by an outside power would not be against the territorial
integrity or political independence of the State. This argument,
standing alone, has never been presented as the official U.S. po-
sition, though it has been suggested in statements of supporters
of the Reagan policy. The argument, if applied consistently,
would have profound implications for the international system
since many, if not most, governments of the world do not meet
the main conditions of political democracy. To consider that de-
ficiency as a sufficient basis to deny their legitimacy, and
thereby to allow force to be used by other States against them
would be a radical departure from the present rules of the State-
system.
In its actual implementation, the Reagan doctrine has been
rather more limited than its rhetoric. It has been confined thus
far to providing military arms, supplies and, in a limited degree,
military advisors to insurgent movements such as the contras in
Nicaragua and the UNITAS in Angola. This aid has been given
only to resistance forces fighting regimes that have been signifi-
cantly supported with military and economic aid by the Soviet
Union and other communist governments. It has been argued
(though this is not clear) that the resistance forces receiving U.S.
aid have had significant popular support. Assuming these factual
" Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78
A.J.I.L. 642, 643 (1984). Compare with Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Inva-
sion, 78 A.J.I.L. 645 (1984).
" 1 JEANE KIRKPATRICK, LEGITIMACY AND FORCE 434-39 (1988).
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propositions to be correct, it can be argued that the U.S. action
maybe a counter-intervention against a prior illegal use of force
by the Soviet-bloc States. On this hypothesis, the lawfulness of
the U.S. intervention would be seen prima facie, as collective
self-defense or a lawful counter-measure to the delictual conduct
of the Soviet Union and its allies. Support by the U.S. (as well
as by Pakistan) of the Afghan resistance could plausibly fit
under collective defense, particularly in view of the U.N. resolu-
tions condemning the Soviet intervention. 6
The United States has not submitted the Reagan doctrine,
as such, to the United Nations or any other major international
forum. It can be safely predicted that, if it did so, it would be
rejected by most States. The debate and vote on the Grenada
invasion is indicative.'7 Hardly any democratic governments
supported that armed intervention, despite their antipathy to
tyrannical and brutal governments. Nor have they argued that
because such governments lack political legitimacy they may be
overthrown by foreign powers. 18 The idea that armed invasions
could make the world "safe for democracy" has had little appeal
to governments. Memories of past invasions and seizures of
power in the name of self-determination and freedom are still
fresh in many parts of the world. Peoples democracies have
been imposed on unwilling peoples. States deeply committed to
democracy have feared the manipulative and tendentious use of
self-determination as a ground for foreign intervention. Govern-
ments of various shades of opinion have a common interest in
rejecting a principle that would encourage their internal opposi-
tion movements to seek foreign military support to topple their
allegedly non-democratic regimes. Moreover, the world in gen-
eral has good reason to worry about the risks of escalation re-
sulting from ideological wars, particularly those involving major
powers. For all these reasons it is highly unlikely that the strong
rhetorical version of the Reagan doctrine will be accepted as
part of contemporary international law. This would still leave
collective self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter,
" G.A. Res. 37/37, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/37/SR.25 (1982).
1 G.A. Res. 38/7, U.N. Doc. AfRes/38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983).
IS See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1641-45 (1984); Cutler, The Right to Intervene, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 96, 106 (1985).
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as a legal basis for counter-intervention by a third State against
illegal military intervention by a foreign power. This, too, is not
without problems and a need for clarification. But, that is a sub-
ject that requires another lecture.
3. Force for Humanitarian Ends
Apart from self-defense, the strongest claim to allowing an
exception to the prohibition of armed force would appear to be
the use of force to save the lives of innocent human beings
threatened by massacres, atrocities, widespread brutality and
destruction. The U.N. Charter has not ended the sorry historic
record of such inhumanity. Internecine wars, persecutions,
forced expulsions, disappearances and the breakdown of order
have been strongly condemned in international forums and by
world opinion generally. Nonetheless, atrocities have continued,
giving rise to a demand for humanitarian intervention to put an
end to the slaughter and degradation.
In support, it has been argued that the renunciation of
armed force could not have been intended to prevent such hu-
manitarian interventions when other means, short of force, were
proven ineffective. The interventions, if limited to humanitarian
ends under conditions of necessity and proportionality, could
not be against the territorial integrity or political independence
of the State in question, nor could they be inconsistent with the
purposes of the Charter. If the U.N. failed to take effective ac-
tion and no other international body did, elementary humanita-
rian principles impose an obligation on States capable of taking
protective measures to do so, including, if necessary, the employ-
ment of armed forces in the troubled countries.19
These arguments, appealing as they seem to be, have failed
to win the explicit support of the international community of
States or of any significant segment of that community. No
United Nations resolution has supported the right of a State to
11 Support for use of force as humanitarian intervention can be found in Lillich,
Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229-51
(Moore 1974); Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547-619 (1987); F.
TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 130-37 (1988). But see BROWNLIE, HUMANITARIAN IN-
TERVENTION IN LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217 (Moore 1974).
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intervene on humanitarian grounds with armed troops in a State
that has not consented to such intervention. Nor is there evi-
dence of State practice and related opinio juris on a scale suffi-
cient to support a humanitarian exception to the general prohi-
bition against non-defensive use of force.
It is true that, in a few cases, the action of an intervening
army outside of its borders was seen as serving a humanitarian
end because it saved innocent lives from death or injury.
Whether these cases can be considered as precedents accepted
as law is dubious, especially as no intervening State claimed a
legal right based on that ground. Thus, when Indian troops ac-
ted to protect Bengalis in East Pakistan in 1971 from Pakistani
troops, India asserted the action was necessary to protect its
borders. It had also referred to the plight of the Bengalis and
the benefit of Indian protection. But the U.N. General Assem-
bly, by a very large majority, declined to support the Indian ar-
guments and called on India to withdraw its forces. Despite
much sympathy for the East Pakistan Bengalis, the great major-
ity of States were clearly unwilling to legitimize India's armed
action as a permissible exception to Article 2(4).20
A second case that some lawyers have viewed as humanita-
rian intervention occurred when Tanzanian troops moved into
Uganda following a Ugandan frontier incursion repulsed by
Tanzania. Actually, Tanzania claimed self-defense rather than a
right of humanitarian intervention. Its subsequent occupation of
Uganda for some months helped to reduce the disorder and
atrocities that had been features of the prior Ugandan regime of
Idi Amin. Whether Tanzania's continued occupation was justi-
fied as self-defense is debatable. Some African leaders criticized
Tanzania's action but understandably, many governments were
not disposed to challenge its relatively benign occupation. It is
hard to regard such non-action as accepting a right of unilateral
intervention for humanitarian ends.21 What it does show is that
governments hesitate to condemn a short-term military move
against an egregious regime. Treating the Tanzanian case as a
20 Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Military Intervention By Mili-
tary Force, 67 A.J.I.L. 275 (1983).
2 See N. RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONALS ABROAD AND INTERVENTION ON GROUNDS OF
HUMANITY 102-06 (1985).
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precedent for the legality of humanitarian invasion seems more
than dubious when we learn that the Obote regime installed by
Tanzania was guilty of at least as many atrocities as its ousted
predecessor.
A claim of humanitarian intent was used by Vietnam to
support its armed action in Cambodia in 1978 against the Pol
Pot forces. However, the main legal claim of Vietnam was that
its armed forces had been requested by the Cambodian govern-
ment in power. That claim was itself questionable since the
Cambodian regime in the country owed its authority to Vietnam
military support. The majority of States in the United Nations
have rejected the Vietnamese contentions and called for the
withdrawal of its troops.2
One recent intervention that could be accepted as humani-
tarian in intent and effect was the French action in 1979 to de-
pose the brutal leader of the Central African Republic, a former
colony of France. The personal atrocities committed by Bokassa,
the deposed leader, and the necessity to use force without delay
were seen as adequate grounds for the French intervention.2"
France's explanation that it had acted for humanitarian ends
and that such action was necessary was not challenged in inter-
national organs.
Our sympathy for victims of atrocities should not obscure
the lessons of past invasions claimed to be humanitarian. Past
armed interventions, going back to 19th century incursions by
imperial powers, have shown that invariably intervening States
have had their own political agendas. They imposed conditions
that were not freely chosen by the people of the country in ques-
tion. They often obtained special advantages and exacerbated
internal conflicts. It is hardly surprising that governments have
refrained from adopting a general rule for humanitarian inter-
vention. Indeed, I believe no government has actually declared
itself as favoring so broad and exception to the rule against
force.
This should not mean that the cases of mass killings, geno-
cide and other egregious violations of elementary principles of
22 Id. at 98-101.
"3 TESON, supra note 19, at 175-79. French troops took part in a bloodless coup to
depose the Emperor Bokassa. Only three African States protested the French action.
[Vol. 1:1
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/1
JUST WAR
humanity should be tolerated and that protective force should
never be used by external powers. However, we do not get far in
meeting the problem by formulating legal principles or guide-
lines on a general level. What is needed is institutional action for
early inquiry and involvement in the incipient stages of threat-
ening atrocities. A Hitler, a Pol Pot, or an Idi Amin should not
be tolerated until thousands have died. If complaint and con-
demnation prove futile, individual States with the requisite ca-
pability should be called upon by the United Nations for force-
ful action under international auspices. The legal authority to do
so exists in the Security Council if it can be reasonably held that
the atrocities will sooner or later threaten peace and security.
True, experience shows that consensus among the permanent
members of the Council may not be easy to reach even in a situ-
ation where the atrocities are extreme and incontrovertible. Fail-
ing Council action, recourse to the General Assembly would pro-
vide an opportunity for community approval. With such
approval, the use of force by individual States would have a
strong moral justification and would probably be widely con-
doned rather than condemned. Even in the absence of such prior
approval, a State or group of States using force to put an end to
atrocities when the necessity is evident and the humanitarian
intention is clear is likely to have its action pardoned. But, I
believe it is highly undesirable to have a new rule allowing hu-
manitarian intervention, for that could provide a pretext for
abusive intervention. It would be better to acquiesce in a viola-
tion that is considered necessary and desirable in the particular
circumstances than to adopt a principle that would open a wide
gap in the barrier against unilateral use of force.
Concluding Remarks: The Choice to be Made
My position, in a nutshell, is that international law does
not, and should not, legitimize the use of force across national
lines except for self-defense (including collective defense) and
enforcement measures ordered by the Security Council. Neither
human rights, democracy or self-determination are acceptable
legal grounds for waging war, nor for that matter, are traditional
just war causes or righting of wrongs. This conclusion is not only
in accord with the U.N. Charter as it was originally understood,
it is also in keeping with the interpretation adopted by the great
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majority of States at the present time. When governments have
resorted to force, they have almost invariably relied on self-de-
fense as their legal justification.24 Whether or not that claim was
well-founded, and clearly in some cases it was not, it is signifi-
cant that it was advanced rather than the claims of human
rights or justice. One might consider defensive war as the con-
temporary equivalent of just war (as the Catholic bishops have
done).26 But this is only a verbal point and does not change the
legal principle.
You are of course still entitled to ask whether the restrictive
rule should remain the law or whether States, particularly the
U.S. and its allies, should seek a more permissive rule; for exam-
ple, a rule that would adopt the Reagan doctrine and allow U.S.
military forces and logistical assistance to support freedom
fighters.
My own view is that this would be a mistake, a dangerous
mistake. We live in a world of diversity, incorrigibly plural,
where perceptions of freedom, well-being and self rule vary and
often conflict in specific cases. They are not only theoretical or
academic. The use of force on one side almost always provokes
force on the opposite side. Moreover, the reality is that when
powerful States intervene with force for good causes, their con-
ception of what is good inevitably reflects their own interest, es-
pecially vis-d-vis contending forces. It is therefore not surprising
that most governments in U.N. debates have viewed with skepti-
cism the claims of other governments, large and small, that they
acted only for defense or in the interest of freedom.
Does the renunciation of force, except for defense, mean
that the moral claims of human rights are subordinate to sover-
eign rights and, in effect, to a statist philosophy? That may well
be true in an abstract sense. In the more concrete sense of real
world situations, armed interventions by foreign States have re-
sulted more often than not in protracted wars and little free-
dom. Vietnam, Nicaragua and Angola are instructive examples.
To say that force may not by used for human rights does
not imply giving up on efforts to achieve such rights through
international efforts. The world has already taken large steps in
24 See Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 A.J.I.L. 259 (1989).
" See J.A. DWYER, THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS AND NUCLEAR WAR (1984).
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that direction. Virtually all agree that there is no Chinese Wall
that seals off the internal conduct of a State towards its citizens
from international scrutiny and censure. It is widely accepted
that States are accountable internationally for their conduct.
This has been implemented by the international fact finding and
recommendatory bodies within the United Nations. In Europe
and Latin America there are human rights commissions and
courts. Only a few days ago, we had the astonishing and encour-
aging announcement by the Soviet Union that it would accept
the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court for disputes aris-
ing under six important human rights treaties. Americans can-
not help observing that their government has only recently rati-
fied the Genocide Convention with a reservation that excludes
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
To be sure, violations of human rights continue throughout
the world and much needs to be done to ensure substantial com-
pliance by most States with their commitments. There is no easy
path to that end. But, it is far better to place our bets on that
effort, than to open the door to, and thereby legitimize, armed
intervention in the name of human rights and just causes.
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